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Where a corporation chartered and doing business in another State
sold goods in Texas, to be transferred and delivered to a person doing
business there, an "action for the price cannot be defeated on the ground
of the company's failure to comply with the statute requiring a foreign
corporation to file a copy of its articles with the Secretary of State of
Texas, since the transaction was an act of interstate commerce, and even
if the statute could be held applicable it would violate the commerce
clause of the Federal Constitution: Bateman v. Western Star Milling
Co., 2o S. W. Rep., 93!, followed.
Opinion by TARLTON, J.
THn RIGHT OF A NON-R SIDXNT To TRANSACT BusINEss IN A STATE.
The clauses of the National Con-
stitution which are usually invoked
to sustain this right are Article i,
8, giving to Congress the right to
regulate commerce among the
several States, Article 4, 2, pro-
viding that the citizens of each
State shall be entitled to all the
privileges and immunities of citi-
zens in the several States, Article
x, Io, forbidding any State with-
out the consent of Congress to lay
duties on imports or exports, or to
lay any duty of tonnage, and I
of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which provides that no State shall
make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United
States.
In Ward v. State of Maryland,
r2 Wall., 418, the plaintiff in error
was indicted in the Criminal Court
of Baltimore for violating a statute
of Maryland by selling by sample
in the city of Baltimore certain
articles of merchandise without
obtaining a license so to do. By
the laws of Maryland, persons not
permanent residents in the State
I Owing to the absence of Mr. Freedley, the editors alone are respon-
sible for this annotation.
2 Reported in 21 S. W. Rep., 300.
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were prohibited from offering for
sale within a certain district of the
State any goods whatever other
than agricultural products and ar-
tides manufactured in the State,
either by card, sample or other
specimen, or by written or printed
trade list or catalogue, whether
such person bethe maker or manu-
facturer or not, without first ob-
taining a license so to do. Licenses
might be granted by the proper
authorities of the State for that
purpose on the payment of $3oo, to
run for one year from date. The
case came before the Court upon
an agreed statement of facts, show-
ing a violation of the statute by
the defendant below, and that he
was at the time of the commission
of the offense and up to the trial a
citizen of the United States and of
the State of New Jersey and resi-
dent in said State. The facts so
agreed raised the single question
whether the Maryland statute was
invalid for repugnancy to the Con-
stitution of the United States. In
the opinion of the Court reference
was made to the limitations on the
power of the several States to levy
taxes and also to the restraint im-
posed by the commerce clause of
the Constitution, but the decision
rested on the point that the statute
under consideration was repugnant
to the second section of Article 4
of the Constitution, Mr. Justice
CLIFFORD saying: "Attempt will
not be made to define the words
'privileges and immunities,' or to
specify the rights which they are
intended to secure and protect,
beyond what may be necessary to
the decision of the case before the
Court. Beyond doubt those words
are words of very comprehensive
meaning, but it will be sufficient to
say that the clause plainly and
unmistakably secures and protects
the right of a citizen of one State
to pass into any other State of the
Union for the purpose of engaging
in lawful commerce, trade or busi-
ness, without molestation; to ac-
quire personal property; to take
and hold real estate; to maintain
actions in" the courts of the State;
and to be exempt from any higher
taxes or excises than are imposed
by the State upon its own citizens:
Cooley, Const. Lim., I6; Brown v.
Maryland, 12 Wheat., 449."
III Robbins v. Taxing District of
Shelby County, 120 U. S., 489, the
constitutionality of a Tennessee
statute, also directed against
foreign drummers, was passed upon
by the Court.. Evidently, with the
intent to avoid the objection raised
against the constitutionility of the
Maryland statute, this provided
that "All drummers and all per-
sons not having a regular licensed
house of business in the taxing
district offering for sale or selling
goods, wares or merchandise there-
in by sample, shall be required to
pay to the county," etc. The
Court, however, held the statute to
be unconstitutional, as offending
against the commerce clause, de-
claring that a State cannot levy
a tax or impose any other restric-
tion upon the inhabitants of other
States for selling or seeking to sell
their goods in such State before
they are introduced therein; that
the negotiation of sales of goods
which are in another State for the
purpose of introducing them into
the State in which the negotiation
is made, is interstate commerce;
that such commerce is not subject
to State taxation, even though
there be no distinction between it
and domestic commerce. A like
ruling was made in the State of
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Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S., 312,
where an attempt was made to put
a tax on the products of other
States by statute requiring as a
condition of sales in Minnesota of
fresh beef, veal, lamb or pork for
human food, that the animals from
which such meats are taken shall
have been inspected in Minnesota
before being slaughtered, the Court
saying, that "a burden imposed
by a State upon interstate com-
merce is not to be sustained simply
because the statute imposing it
applies alike to the people of all
the States, including the people of
the State enacting such statute."
THE RIGHT OF A FOREIGN COR-
PORATION To TRANSACT BusINEss
IN A STATE.-Such being the safe-
guards which insure to a citizen of
the United States the right to carry
on business ift he various States of
which he is not a resident, ve shall
now consider whether any such
rights are given to a foreign cor-
poration. In the celebrated-case
of Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall., 168, it
was held that corporations are not
"citizens" within the meaning of
Article 4, 2 of the National Con-
stitution, declaring that "The citi-
zens of each State shall be entitled
to all privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several States," and
this has been followed in the more
recent case of Pembina C. S. M. &
N. Co. v. Penna., 125 U. S., i8i.
That case upheld the constitu-
tionality of an Act of Assembly of
the State of Pennsylvania provid-
ing that no foreign corporation,
except foreign insurance com-
panies, which did not invest and
use its capital in that common-
wealth, should have an office
therein for the use of its officers,
stockholders, agents or employees,
unless it should first .obt4in a
license so to do, for which it was
required to pay to the State Treas-
urer annually one-quarter of a
mill on the dollar of capital stock
which it was authorized to have.
The plaintiff in error was incor-
porated under the laws of Colorado
for the purpose of carrying on a
general miningandmillingbusiness
in that State, where it had its prin-
cipal office. During the year 1881
it occupied an office in the city of
Philadelphia for the use of its
officers, stockholders, agents and"
employees, and was assessed for
office license under the act above
recited by the Auditor-General of
Pennsylvania. In its opinion the
Court said: "The only limitation
upon this power of the State to
exclude a foreign corporation from
doing business within its limits, or
hiring offices for that purpose, or to
exact conditions for allowing the
corporation to do business or hire
offices there, arises where the cor-
poration is in. the employ of the
Federal Government, or where its
business is strictly commerce, inter-
state or foreign.' The control of
such commerce, being in the Fed-
eral Government, is not to be re-
stricted by State authority."
While it was laid down as law in
Sante Clara Co. v. Southarn Pacific
Railway, 118 U. S., 394, that the
provision of the Fourteenth Ainend-
ment of the Constitution of the
United States, which forbids.a State
to deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of
the law, applies to corporations,
yet, in Phila. Fire Association v.
New York, II9 U. S., Iio, it was
held -that this .piovision does not
prohibit a State from imposing
such conditions upon foreign.cor-
porations as it may choose as a
condition of their admission within
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its limits, and that they cannot be
- of right within such jurisdiction
until they receive the consent of
the State to their entrance therein.
* In so deciding, however, the court
was careful to add that it was not
to be implied from what was there
- said, "that the power of a State to
exclude a foreign corporation from
* doing business within its limits, is
to be regarded as extending to an
interference with the transaction of
commerce between that State and
-other States by a corporation
created by one of such other
States."
The suggestion there thrown out,
that corporations are within the
protection of the commerce clause
of the Constitution, had before been
asserted in Gloucester Ferry Co. v.
Pa., 114 U. S., 196, and was after-
ward exemplified in the cases of
McCaull v. California, 136 U. S.,
1o4; N. W. Ry. Co. v. Penna., 136
U. S., 114, and Crutcher v'. Ken-
tucky, 141 U. S.; 47. In the last-
mentioned case it was held that a
State la'v which forbids a corpora-
tion of another State from carrying
on its business of interstate com-
merce within the State without
taking out a license and paying a
license fee to the State is not an
exercise of the police power of the
State which is permissible -as
against the power of Congress to
regulate interstate commerce.
Neither licenses nor indirect taxa-
tion of any kind, nor any system
of State regulation can be imposed
upon interstate any more than
foreign commerce. It must, how-
ever, be borne in mind that the lan-
guage used by the court is pre-
dicated of foreign corporations en-
gaged in the business of transporta-
tion between different States, Mr.
Justice BRADLzY, who delivered
the opinion, saying: "The case is
entirely different from" that of
foreign corporations seeking to do
a business which does not belong to
the regulating power of Congress.
The insurance business, for ex-
ample, cannot be carried on in a
State by a foreign corporation with-
out complying with all the condi-
tions imposed by the legislation of
thatState. So with regard to manu-
facturing corporations and all other
corporations whose business is of a
local and domestic nature, which
would include express companies,
whose business is confined to points
and places wholly within the State.
The cases to this effect are numer-
ous: Bank of Augusta v. Earle,
38 U. S., 13 Pet. 519; Paul v.
Virginia, 75 U. S., 8 Wall., i68;
Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachu-
setts, 77 U. S., io' Wall., 566;
Cooper Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson,
113 U. S., 727; Phila. F. Asso. v.
New York, 119 U. S., iio." To
which list of cases may be added
the recent decision in Horn Silver
Mining Co. v. State of New York,
143 U. S., 314, where the court says
that this power of a State to exclude
foreign corporations or to impose
conditions upon which it permits
them to do business within its
limits is a doctrine "so frequently
declared by this court that it must
be deemed no longer a matter of
discussion if any question can ever
be considered at rest. Only two
exceptions or qualifications have
been attached to it in all the
numerous adjudications in which
the subject has been considered
since the judgment of this court
was announced more than a half
century ago in Bank of Augusta v.
Earle, 38 U. S., 13 Pet., 51g.
One of these qualifications is that
the State cannot exclude from its
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limits a corporation engaged in the
interstate or foreign commerce es-
tablished by the decision in Pensa--
cola Teleg. Co. v. Western U.
Teleg. 'Co., 96 U. S., I, 12. The
other limitation on the power of
the State is where the corporation
is in the employ of the general
government, an obvious exception,
first stated, we think, by the late
Mr. Justice BRADLEY, in Stockton
v. Baltimore & N. Y. R. R. Co., 32
Fed. Rep., 9, 14. As that learned
Justice said: "If Congress should
employ a corporation of ship-
builders to construct a man-of-war,
they would have the right to pur-
chase the necessary timber and iron
in any State of the Union." And
this court, in citing this passage,
added, "without the permission
and against the prohibition of the
State:" Pembina Con. S. Min. &
Mill- Co. 'v. Penna., 125 U. S., I8I,
z86."
Can it then be said that under
the decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States a foreign cor-
poration is entitled to the same
freedom in carrying on interstate
commerce as citizens of the several
States? Or, to put it in another
way, has the exact point decided
in the case at the head of this note
been passed on by the Supreme
Court of the United States? This
question cannot be answered un-
qualifiedly in the affirmative, al-
though such a holding would seem
to be a logical necessity from what
has been explicitly decided. As
far back as 1884, in the case of
Gloucester. Ferry Co. v. Penna.,
114 U. S., 198, the Court, speaking
by ir. Justice FIELD, said: "Nor
does it make any difference
whether such commerce is carried
on by individuals or by corpora-
tions: Welton [v. Missouri, 91 U.
S., 275; Mobile Co. v. Kimball,
102 U. S., 69.. As was said in Paul
v. Virginia, at the time of the
formation of the Constitution, a
large portion of the commerce of
the world was carried on by cor-
porations; and the East India
Company, the Hudson's Bay Com-
pany, the Hamburgh Company,
the Levant Company and the Vir-
ginia Company were mentioned as
among the corporations which,
from the extent of their operations,
had become celebrated throughout-
the commercial world: 8 Wall, 168.
The grant of power is general in
its terms, making no reference to
the agencies by which commerce
may be cairied on. It includes
commerce by whomsoever con-
ducted, whether by individuals or
by corporations. At the 'present
day nearly all enterprises of a com-
mercial character requiring for
their successful management large'•
expenditures of money -are con-
ducted by corporations. The usual
means of transportation on the
public waters .where expedition is
desired are vessels propelled b5y
steam; and the ownership of a
line of such vessels generally re-
quires an expenditure exceeding
the resources -of single individuals.
vlExcept in rare instances, it is only
by associated capital furnished by
persons united in corporations, that
the requisite means are provided
for such expenditures."
This language was quoted with
approval in the subsequent case of
P. C. S. M. S. Co. v. Penna., 122
U. 8., 326.
The question then would seem to
resolve itself into the determina-
tion of whether the negotiation of
the sale of goods which are in
another State by a foreign corpora-
tion, for the purpose of introducing
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them into the State in which the
negotiation is made, is an act of
interstate commerce. We have
already seen, in the decisions of
Ward v. Maryland, and Robbins v.
Taxing District of Shelby County,
sufra, that when such acts are
done by individuals they are held
to constitute interstate commerce,
and it is. difficult to understand
how their character could change
in this respect.merely because the
vendor in one case was an indi-
vidual and in the other a corpora-
tion. Nevertheless, it should be
borne in mind that in those cases
in which a corporation has been
held to be within the protection of
the commerce clause, such corpor-
ation has been actually engaged in
the transportation of messages,
goods or passengers between two or
more of the States, and- in the case
* of Cooper Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson, 113
.'. U. S., 727, while two of the court
" put themselves on record as enter-
. taining the views set forth in the
S.-case at the head of this note, yet
the majority of the court, not find-
ing it necessary to base their de-
cision on that point, declined to
express any opinion on the question
we are here considering. The facts
in that case were as follows: The
Act of the legislature of Colorado.
provided that foreign corporations
should file certain certificates with
the secretary of State as a condition
precedent to their doing business
therein, and that a failure to com-
ply therewith should render the
officers, agents or stockholders of
such corporations individually
liable on all its contracts 2Iiade
while the corporation was so in
default. These provisions of the
law of Colorado being in force,
the plaintiff in error, mhich was a
corporation organized under the
laws of Ohio, and having its prin-
cipal place of business in that
State, entered into a con'tract with-
in the State of Colorado with de-
fendants, who are citizens thereof,
by which it agreed to sell and
deliver to them a steam engine and
other machinery for a stipulated
price. Suit was brought by plain-
tiff to recover damages for breach
of said contract. The defendants,
among other defences, pleaded that
when the contract was entered into
the plaintiff had not made and filed
the certificate required by the Act
aforesaid. To this answer plaintiff
demurred. The demurrer was over-
ruled by a divided court, and the
plaintiff .electing to stand by its
demurrer, judgment was entered
against it, dismissing itp suit and
for costs, which judgment was
brought under review by the writ
of error in the case. From the
brief of counsel it may be inferred
that the unconstitutionality of the
Act, as offending against the com-
merce clause, was not urged by the
plaintiff in error, though touched
on in the opinion of the Court, the
contention being that the pro-
visions of the Act in question ap-
plied only to corporations of other
States which came to Colorado
with the intention of carrying on
the business for which they were
incorporated, that any other inter-
pretation would prevent single
transactions between foreign cor-
porations and a citizen, and that
the performance of a single isolated
act, such as making of a single
contract, does not constitute doing
business within the State within
the meaning of such legal pro-
visions as that of the Act under
consideration. This was also the
view taken by the majority of the
court, Mr. Justice WOODS, who
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delivered this opinion, saying:
" We base the conclusion that the
demurrer to the defendant's answer
should have been sustained upon
the interpretation we have given
to the Constitution and statute, and
do not find it necessary to decide
whether their provisions invade
the exclusive right of Congress to
regulate commerce among the
several States. We have examined
all the cases cited by the defend-
ants to support their interpretation.
In none of them was the statute
construed similar in its language
or provisions to the Constitution
or statute under consideration, and
the cases can have no controlling
weight in the present contro-
versy."
Mr. justice MXTTHEws and Mr.
Justice BLATCHFORD, however,
while concurring in the judgment
of the Court, took the ground that
whatever might be the construction
of the statute, the transaction in
question was an act of interstate
commerce, and that the State had
no power to prohibit a foreign cor-
poration from selling in Colorado
by contract made there its ma-
chinery manufactured elsewhere.
Their opinion reads as follows:
"Mr. Justice MATTHEWS: Mr.
Justice BEATCHFORD and myself
concur in the judgment of the
Court announced in this case, but
on different grounds from those
stated in the opinion.
"Whatever power may be con-
ceded to a State to prescribe condi-
tions on which foreign corpora-
tions may transact business within
its limits, it cannot be admitted to
extend so far as to prohibit or reg-
ulate commerce among the States,
for that would be to invade the
jurisdiction which, by the terms
of the Constitution of the United
States, is conferred exclusively
upon Congress.
"In the present case the construc-
tion claimed for the Constitution
of Colorado, and the statute of
that State passed in execution of it,
cannot be extended to prevent the
plaintiff in error, a corporation of
another State, from transacting any
business in Colorado, which, of
itself, is commerce. The transac-
tion in question was clearly of that
character. It was the making of a
contract in Colorado to manufac-
ture certain machinery in Ohio, to
be there delivered for transporta-
tion to the purchasers in Colorado.
That was commerce, and to pro-
hibit it, except upon conditions, is
to regulate commerce between Col-
orado and Ohio, which is within
the exclusive province of Congress..
It is quite competent, no doubt, for
Colorado to prohibit a foreign cor-"
poration from acquiring a domicile
in that State, and to prohibit it
from carrying on within that State
its business of manufacturing ma-
chinery. But it cannot prohibit it
from selling in" Colorado, by con-
tracts made there, its machinery
manufactured elsewhere, for that
would be to regulate commerce
among the States.
"In Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall.,
168, the issuing of a policy of in-
surance was expressly held not to
be a transaction of commerce, and,
therefore, not excluded from the
control of State laws, and the deci-
sion in that case is predicated upon
that distinction. It is, therefore,
not inconsistent with these views."
In view of this case one can
hardly say with certainty that
when the question shall arise for
decision by the Supreme Court of
the United States the ruling of a
majority of the members will be to
66 RIGHT OF NON-RISIDENT TO TRANSACT BUSINESS.
-the same effect as that of Ift. Jus-
tice r unws and Mr. Justice
BLATCHFORD in the opinion just
quoted, but for reasons already
given such would seem to be the
o nly logical outcome of the cases
we have reviewed. The Views ex-
pressed by the Justices mentioned
have been followed in Ware v.
* Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. (S. C.,
Ala.), 9 So. Rep., 136; Mfg. Co. v.
Hardie (N. M.), I6 Pac. Rep., 136.
DoES A SINGLE TRANSACTION
CONSTITUTE DOING BUSINESs
WITHIN THE MEANING OF SUCH
STATUTES? -While the wording
of the statutes in the different
I States varies somewhat, and the
difference in wording may affect
the determination of this ques-
tion, roughly speaking' an affir-
• mative, answer has been given in
the following cases: Is re Com-
stock, 3 Sawy., 218; Bank v. Page,
6 Ore., 431; Thorne z. Ins. Co., 8o
Pa., 15 (orpare Campbell Co. v.
Hering, 139 Pa., 473); Roche v.
Ladd.', I Allen, 44I; Ins. Co. v.
Slaughter, 20 Ind., 520; Ins. Co. v.
Pursell, ib Allen, 231; Cincinnati
H. & M. Ins. Co. v. Rosenthal, 55
IIl., 85; Ins. Co. v. Harvey, ii Wis.,
412; Farrior v. New Bngland Mort-
gage Security Co., 8& Ala., 275.
While the contrary has been held
in Potter v. Bank, 5 Hill, 491; Gra-
ham v. Hendricks, 22 La. Ann.,
523; Suydam v. Morris C. & B.
Co., 6 Hell., 217; Nay. Co. v. Weed,
17 Barb., 378; Gilchrist v. Helena
H. S. & R. Co., 47 F., 593; Colorado
R4wy. Works v. Sierra Grande Min-
ing Co., i5 Colo., 499; Cooper Mfg.
Co. v. Ferguson, 113 U. S., 727.
EFFECT OF NON-COMPLIANCE
WITH SAID LAwS.-In some of
the States all contracts made by
foreign corporations, before com-
plying with the conditions in-
posed by the statutes of the
States in which the .contracts
are made, are held to be void.
And this even where the statutes
do not expressly so provide, on the
ground that whenever an act is
made subject to a penalty by a stat-
ute it is considered as prohibited
and void: Ins. Co. z. Slaughter, 20,
Ind., 520; Cincinnati M. H. A. Co.
v. Rosenthal, 55 Ill., 85; Ins. Co.
v. Pursell, io Allen, 232; Roche v.
Ladd, I Allen, 441; Thorne v. Ins.
Co., 8o Pa., IS; Bank v. Page, 6
Oreg., 431; In re Comstock, 3
Sawy., 218: Semnple v. Bank BHtish
Columbia, 5 Sawy., 88.
On the other hand, it has been
held that where a penalty is pre-
scribed for failure to comply with
the requirements of such statute
the contracts of a foreign corpora-
tion which has not complied there-
with are not void, as the penalty
prescribed is exclusive of all other:
Ehrman v. Teutonia Ins. Co., I.
McCrary, 123; Columbus Ins. Co.,
v. Walsh, 18 M o., 229; Clark v.
Middleton, 19 Mo., 53; Brooklyn
Life Ins. Co. v. Bledore, 52 Ala.,
538; Union M ut. Life Ins. Co. v.
McMillan, 24 Ohio St., 67; King
v. National M. & E. Co., 4 Mo., I;
Lumber Co. v. Thomas, 33 West
Va., 566.
But even though the contract
thus made may be void, so that an
action based upon it could not be
maintained, yet suit without refer-
ence to the contract may be had
for benefits conferred: Morawetz
on Corporations, 2d ed., 721, and
cases there cited; Brice Ultra Vires,
2d ed., 796; Holmes v. Barnard, I5
W. N. C. (Pa.), ho; Thorne v.
Travellers' Ins. Co., 8o Pa., 15.
And it does not follow that be-
cause such contract is treated as
void in the State where it was made
